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DUE PROCESS-REVOCATION OF DRIVER'S LICENSE
Stauffer v. Weedlun, 188 Neb. 105, 195 N.W.2.d 218 (1972)
In Stauffer v. Weedlun,' the Nebraska Supreme Court held re-
vocation of a driver's license upon accumulation of twelve or more
traffic violation points meets due process requirements despite
the absence of statutory provisions for prior hearing and notice to
the driver. The decision merits further consideration in light of an
earlier case, Bell v. Burson,2 in which the United States Supreme
Court held due process was violated when a driver's license was
suspended pursuant to a financial responsibility law, because of
lack of a prior notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the driv-
er's possible liability. This casenote will consider the grounds on
which the Nebraska Supreme Court distinguished revocation of a
driver's license for traffic violations from suspension pursuant to fi-
nancial responsibility laws. Specifically, analysis will focus on
the Nebraska Supreme Court's reliance on the "emergency doc-
trine"3 and the court's decision that a judicial stay of the order of
revocation pending judicial review affords the licensee due process.
I.
In the Nebraska case, the Director of the Nebraska Department
of Motor Vehicles notified 4 Stauffer his license was revoked. The
1. 188 Neb. 105, 195 N.W.2d 218, appeal dismissed 401 U.S. 972 (1972).
Cases from other jurisdictions involving due process and driver's
license revocation include Reese v. Kassab, 334 F. Supp. 744 (W.D.
Pa. 1971); Carter v. Department of Pub. Safety, 290 A.2d 652 (Del.
Super. 1972); Broughton v. Warren, 281 A.2d 625 (Del. Ch. 1971);
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 467 S.W.2d 335 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971).
2. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
3. Justice Brennan, in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), wrote "it is
fundamental that except in emergency situations (and this is not one)
due process requires . . . 'notice and opportunity for a hearing ap-
propriate to the nature of the case' before the termination becomes
effective." Id. at 542. In Broughton v. Warren, 281 A.2d 625, 629(Del. Ch. 1971), the court referred to the due process exceptions for
emergencies stated in Bell as the "emergency doctrine."
4. NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-7,130 (Reissue 1968). "Within twenty-four hours
after the revocation provided for by section 39-7,129, the Director of
the Department of Motor Vehicles shall notify in writing the person
whose license or privilege has been revoked that such license or
privilege has been revoked."
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revocation was based on the accumulation of fourteen traffic vio-
lation points and was effective the day the order was signed.5 Fol-
lowing statutory provisions,6 Stauffer appealed the revocation to the
Lancaster County District Court. The court issued a restraining
order and a stay of revocation until the judicial hearing. At the
hearing, the court affirmed the revocation and reinstated the order
revoking Stauffer's license.
Stauffer appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court, alleging that
the district court erred in upholding the constitutionality of the
driver's license revocation statutes.7 He argued the statutes vio-
lated both the due process clause of the Nebraska Constitution and
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution in fail-
ing to provide the licensee with pre-revocation notice and the op-
portunity for a hearing.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the revocation on two
grounds: First, public interest in removing drivers with an ex-
cessive number of traffic violations from the highways outweighed
the need for notifying the driver and providing an opportunity for
a hearing prior to revocation (the "emergency doctrine"). 8 Sec-
5. NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 39-7,129 (Reissue 1968):
Whenever it shall come to the attention of the Director of
Motor Vehicles that any person has, as disclosed by the records
of such director, accumulated a total of twelve or more points
within any period of two years, as set out in section 39-7,128,
the director shall summarily revoke (1) the license and privi-
lege of such person to operate a motor vehicle in this state or
(2) the privilege, if such operator is a nonresident, of operat-
ing a motor vehicle within this state. Such revocation shall
be for a period of one year from the date of the signing of
the order of revocation or one year from the date of the
release of such person from the jail or the Nebraska Penal
and Correction Complex, whichever is later, unless a longer
period of revocation was directed by the terms of the certified
abstract of the judgment of conviction forwarded to the
director by the trial court.
6. NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-7,130 (Reissue 1968):
Any person, who feels himself aggrieved because of such
revocation, may appeal therefrom to the district court in the
county wherein such person resides or, in the case of a non-
resident, to the district court of Lancaster County, in the
manner prescribed in section 60-420. Such appeal shall not
suspend the order of revocation of such license unless a stay
therefore shall be allowed by a judge of said court pending
a final determination of the review; Provided, the license of
any person claiming to be aggrieved shall not be restored to
such person, in the event the final judgment of a court finds
against such person, until the full time of revocation, as fixed
by the department, shall have elapsed.
7. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 39-7,128 to -7,133 (Reissue 1968).
8. 188 Neb. at 114, 195 N.W.2d at 224. The Nebraska Supreme Court did
not recognize the "emergency doctrine" per se, but recognized a
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ondly, the district court's stay of the order of revocation pending
judicial review afforded Stauffer due process.9
Procedural due process has been traditionally interpreted as re-
quiring notice and the opportunity for a hearing before taking a
person's property interest.
Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard;
and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be
notified. Common justice requires that no man shall be con-
demned in his person or property without notice and an oppor-
tunity to make his defense.' 0
Due process provides not only standards of notice and hear-
ing,:" but also determines when the notice and opportunity for a
hearing must be given. This temporal aspect of due process has
been read as requiring notice and the opportunity for a hearing be-
fore the deprivation of a property interest. The United States
Supreme Court has said:
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract
words of the due process clause but there can be no doubt that at
a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or prop-
erty by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.1 2
public interest prevailing over the individual's due process interest
which is, in effect, the "emergency doctrine" developed in Bell. See
note 3 supra.
9. 188 Neb. at 104, 195 N.W.2d at 222. As recognized in the subsequent
case of State v. Lessert, 188 Neb. 243, 196 N.W.2d 166 (1972), the court
in Stauffer v. Weedlun overruled Bradford v. Rees, 167 Neb. 338, 93
N.W.2d 17 (1958), which had been construed as limiting judicial
review of the license revocation to the records of the Motor Vehicle
Dep't. The court said in Lessert the Stauffer decision established a
broader scope of judicial review, including challenging of void judg-
ments, and fraudulent records, in the de novo review of the revoca-
tion order. 188 Neb. at 246, 196 N.W.2d at 168.
The Stauffer decision, following Bell's lead, specifically overruled
Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d 620 (1952), which held that
a driver's license, being a privilege and not property, was not subject
to the due process clause. Bell held driver's licenses to be "important
interests .... [T]he license is not to be taken away without pro-
cedural due process." 402 U.S. at 539.
10. Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1864). Grannis v.
Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274,
277 (1876).
11. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
12. Id. (emphasis added). Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970); Snaidach v.
Family Finance, 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Opp Cotton Mills, Inc.
v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941); United States v. Illinois
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While the due process norm is prior notice and opportunity for a
hearing, exceptions have been established. These exceptions, re-
ferred to as "extraordinary situations,"13 arise primarily where the
governmental (public) interest is greater than the individual's
interest in receiving prior notice and opportunity for a hearing.' 4
Examples of such "extraordinary situations" are governmental
interest in collecting revenue promptly, 5 protection of the public
in securities transactions, 6 exigencies of a national war effort, 7
protection of the public from food not fit for consumption 8 and
misbranded items,' 9 and preservation of a court's integrity through
summary contempt proceedings. 20
Recently, the United States Supreme Court, after balancing the
competing governmental and personal interests, struck down
summary deprivations of personal interests where prior notice and
opportunity for a hearing were not provided. The cases include
termination of welfare benefits,21 child dependency proceedings, 22
garnishment of wages, 23 and prejudgment replevin.24
In Bell v. Burson,25 the Court declared the Georgia financial re-
sponsibility law unconstitutional. The statutory infirmity was that
Cent. R.R., 291 U.S. 457, 463 (1934); Londoner v. City & County of
Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908).
13. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971). The Court ex-
plained:
That the hearing required by due process is subject to waiver,
and is not fixed in form does not affect its root requirement
that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before
he is deprived of any significant property interest, except
for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental
interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until
after the event.
Id. at 378-79.
14. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895(1961) (governmental security interest found greater than individual
interest of working at a particular defense plant).
15. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
16. R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 911 (1962).
17. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414 (1944); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921); Central
Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 (1921).
18. North Am. Cold Storage v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
19. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
20. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925); Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S.
267 (1889); In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
21. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
22. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
23. Snaidach v. Family Finance, 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
24. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
25. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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a driver's license could be suspended for failure to post security
covering damages claimed by other parties involved in an acci-
dent, without a prior hearing on liability.26 A hearing was pro-
vided by Georgia statute,2 7 but admissable evidence contained noth-
ing related to liability.28 The Court held state interest in preventing
additional expenses for an expanded hearing and public interest in
protecting another claimant from an unrecoverable judgment did
not outweigh the individual's right to a prior hearing under the
fault-oriented Georgia statute.29 Finally, the Court noted this was
not an emergency situation which necessitated summary proceed-
ings.30
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Stauffer refused to analogize
driver's license revocation for traffic violations with driver's license
suspension for failure to comply with financial responsibility laws.
Rather, it used the "emergency doctrine" exception recognized in
Bell.31 The court said:
The compelling public interest in removing from the highways
those drivers whose records demonstrate unsafe driving habits
outweighs the need for notice and hearing prior to the order .... In
this connection the matter must be viewed not as an isolated case
but in the collective aspect, that is, the removal of many such driv-
ers from the highway .... [I]n our case the Legislature has de-
termined, and we believe reasonably so, that a habit of repeated
traffic violations has a definite relationship to the fitness of the
driver to operate a motor vehicle and hence to the compelling
public interest in safety on the highways. 32
The public interest is probably more directly served by a sum-
mary revocation of a driver's license for repeated traffic violations
than by a summary suspension for failure to comply with financial
responsibility laws. The latter protects the public against judg-
ment-proof drivers, a monetary consideration which is an insuf-
ficient basis for grounding an "emergency doctrine" exception to
due process.33 Point system revocation statutes protect the public
from the repetitive traffic violators who threaten the public's phy-
sical safety-an interest more in line with "extraordinary situa-
tions." Public interest in summarily removing the repetitive vio-
lator from the highway based on safety outweighs the violator's
right to pre-revocation notice and hearing. Therefore, the ab-
26. Id. at 541.
27. GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-602 (Reissue 1972).
28. 402 U.S. at 537-38.
29. Id. at 540-41.
30. Id. at 542. See note 3 supra.
31. Id.
32. 188 Neb. at 114, 195 N.W.2d at 224.
33. 402 U.S. at 540-41.
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sence of pre-revocation notice and hearing would not be unconsti-
tutional under the "emergency doctrine."34
Also, Stauffer differentiated the point violation law and the
Georgia law based on natures of the statutes. Pursuant to the
Georgia financial responsibility law, the license was suspended with-
out prior hearing on the possible liability of the licensee. This was
the fatal defect.35 However, the driver's license of the Nebraska
traffic violator is revoked based on the violator's record.36 The
statute provides "the director shall summarily revoke"37 the li-
cense upon accumulation of twelve or more violation points, the
points being assigned after, and based upon, judicial determination
of guilt.
II.
The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld Stauffer's license revoca-
tion not only on the basis of the "emergency doctrine," but also on
the ground that Stauffer was afforded due process by the district
court's stay of the revocation order.38
The justification was the United States Supreme Court's per cur-
iam decision in Jennings v. Mahoney,39 decided after Bell. Jen-
nings was notified by the Director of the Financial Responsibility
Division of the Utah Department of Public Safety that unless she
proved financial responsibility, her license would be suspended un-
der the financial responsibility statute. The Utah law did not
34. The court's reliance on the "emergency doctrine" as justifying sum-
mary license suspension upon the accumulation of 12 traffic violation
points may be criticized. The court did not prove a driver with 12
points creates a greater "emergency" than the driver with 11. For
instance, a driver could have his license suspended for 12 convictions
of being 3 miles over the speed limit on 12 clear, dry, sunlit days on
isolated highways in the Sandhills. Simultaneously, another driver
could be con~victed of reckless driving as a result of an accident and
2 other separate convictions involving being 25 miles over the speed
limit during the rush hour on a rainy day in Omaha on Interstate 80.
Clearly, the latter creates the greater public emergency, yet his license
is not automatically suspended.
While such examples may be polar extremes, the legislative
decision to suspend a license after accumulation of 12 traffic violation
points is arbitrary line drawing. Therefore, the court might be
criticized for holding an emergency exists which justifies taking of an
individual's license by summary procedure when such emergency is
based on the accumulation of an arbitrary number.
35. 402 U.S. at 541.
36. 188 Neb. at 112, 195 N.W.2d at 223.
37. NEB. Rv. STAT. § 39-7,129 (Reissue 1968). See note 5 supra.
38. 18a Neb. at 109, 195 N.W.2d at 222.
39. 404U.S. 25 (1971).
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provide for a prior administrative hearing as to driver liability; 40
however, the Utah district court stayed the order of suspension
pending judicial review.
The Supreme Court noted that, although the Utah financial re-
sponsibility law might violate due process as required by Bell, the
question need not be answered in Jennings.41 Instead, the court
held "the district court in fact afforded this appellant such proced-
ural due process. That court stayed the Director's suspension or-
der pending completion of judicial review ... *"42 No explana-
tion was given as to why a stay of the suspension afforded the li-
censee due process.
The Nebraska court was incorrect in placing such broad reli-
ance on Jennings. The suspension in Jennings was never effective
prior to the judicial stay of the order. The Utah statute provided
notice of the suspension be sent to the licensee "not less than ten
days prior to the effective date of such suspension. '43  Since the
Utah driver also must file a petition for judicial review within
ten days after notice of suspension, 44 the suspension of Jennings' li-
cense apparently was not effective before the stay pending judicial
review. Jennings was afforded due process consistent with Bell as
she received a judicial hearing before her license was effectively
suspended.
Because the Nebraska statute differs from Utah's, the holding in
Jennings can be distinguished from Stauffer. The order of revoca-
tion in Nebraska is effective on the date of its signing.45 The dis-
trict court's stay of the order pending judicial review occurred
after the revocation was in effect, as opposed to Jennings where
the stay came before the suspension order took effect. Bell and
Jennings seem to require a judicial stay before the effective suspen-
sion. In Stauffer, the judicial stay occurred after the revocation was
effective. Therefore, Stauffer was not afforded due process by the
judicial stay of the revocation.
Fuentes v. Shevin,46 a 1972 Supreme Court case, casts further
doubt on the Stauffer decision. Fuentes held prejudgment re-
plevin statutes violated due process if they denied the possessor the
opportunity for a hearing prior to being deprived of a chattel.47 The
40. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12-5(b) (Repl. 1970).
41. 404 U.S. at 26.
42. Id.
43. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12-5(b) (Repl. 1970).
44. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12-2 (b) (Repl. 1970).
45. NEB. Rzv. STAT. § 39-7,129 (Reissue 1968). See note 3 supra.
46. 406 U.S. 67 (1972).
47. Id. at 86.
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Supreme Court noted while replevin is a nonfinal taking, "a tempo-
rary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a 'deprivation'
in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 48 Bell was cited for this
proposition. The court added although the length of deprivation
may be a consideration in determining the form of hearing, it does
not preclude the right to prior hearing, no matter how quickly the
property can be recovered.49
Applying this rule, Fuentes seems to require a different con-
clusion on this ground of the Stauffer decision. A nonfinal depri-
vation was involved in Stauffer as an effective suspension could
be stayed pending ultimate judicial determination. Fuentes appears
to say provisions for a stay in the revocation are not sufficient for
due process. Rather, a prior hearing is required regardless of the
period or nonfinality of deprivation. Therefore, the Lancaster
County District Court's stay of the revocation order failed to afford
Stauffer due process for there was a taking without prior notice
and hearing.
This ground of Stauffer retains some limited vitality. Fuentes,
while requiring a prior hearing in cases of nonfinal deprivations,
recognized the "emergency doctrine" exceptions to prior notice and
hearing.50 Therefore, the second ground of Stauffer is viable, but
not as an independent basis for holding the statutory procedure
constitutional. A stay in the order of revocation does provide the
licensee due process but is acceptable only in cases where the "emer-
gency doctrine" exceptions are applicable (the alternative ground
in Stauffer).
In conclusion, the Nebraska Supreme Court held summary revo-
cation of Stauffer's driver's license was constitutional on two
grounds. First, such suspension did not violate due process under
the "emergency doctrine" and was distinguishable from financial
responsibility suspension. The court's second and seemingly inde-
pendent ground, that a stay in the order of revocation pending ju-
dicial review provides the licensee due process, is not as constitu-
tionally broad as it appears. The Nebraska court misinterpreted
Jennings, for, in that case, the Supreme Court held a judicial stay
in a driver's license suspension satisfies due process only where the
stay comes before the suspension is effective. In Stauffer, the stay
came after the suspension was effective. Fuentes holds due pro-
cess requires prior notice and hearing wherever deprivation is non-
48. Id. at 85.
49. Id. at 86.
50. "There are 'extraordinary situations' that justify postponing notice and
opportunity for a hearing." Id. at 90-92.
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final. Fuentes did, however, reaffirm the "emergency doctrine" ex-
ceptions to due process recognized in Bell. Therefore, a stay of the
order of revocation pending judicial review, although absent pre-
revocation notice and hearing, may afford the licensee due process,
but only in those limited situations where the "emergency doc-
trine" applies.
Clark R. Irey '74
